The Logic of the Bush Administration's North Korea Policy
By David L. Asher, Ph.D.
American Enterprise Institute
February 1, 2006
(speech presented at American Enterprise Institute)
I appreciate the opportunity to speak here at my old home base. It's great to be back at AEI. Let me make the obligatory preface that I left the Department of State, where I coordinated the North Korea Working Group, in July of last year. Obviously, I am speaking in a non-official capacity.
Since I departed, the Six Party Talks hesitantly lifted off, albeit to become side-lined in the wake of North Korean recriminations over the imposition of USA Patriot Section 311 provisions against Banco Delta in Macao and US charges against Sean Garland of the Official IRA in Ireland for leading a North Korea counterfeit dollar distribution network in Europe.
North Korea's official press agency, KCNA, has declared its government does "not allow such things as bad treatment of the people, counterfeiting and drug trafficking." In another piece, the DPRK asserted, "We had neither counterfeited currency nor gotten involved in any illegal trafficking." It added the DPRK has now adopted "an attitude that it will not participate in the six-party talks, unless the unjust US "financial sanctions" are lifted."
Where does this leave us? Is all hope lost for a diplomatic solution? Is simple law enforcement really being used to box the DPRK in and sabotage the Six Party Talks by so-called hardliners?
As someone who played a role in developing and implementing the US strategy over the last four years and who considers himself a realist, not a "hard liner," I'd like to provide some brief commentary and analysis. I will make five points, concluding on a note of optimism that we are in a far better position to make diplomatic progress than is widely recognized, provided that we are realistic.
The first point is that we need to approach the North as it is, not as we wish it would become. We need to recognize the unfortunate truth that over the last decade and a half, as the industrial economy of Kim Il Song has collapsed, rather than engaging in serious economic reform in partnership with the ROK and other concerned nations, the DPRK leadership has sought to fill the void by using nuclear coercion and embracing trans-national organized crime as major means of support. The DPRK through its actions, affiliations, and attitudes has become something of a "criminal state" - a government leadership that has adopted crime as part of its economic survival strategy.
Counterfeit currency, counterfeit cigarettes, counterfeit Viagra, weapons smuggling, money laundering, you name it, they are in to it - typically with Chinese triad partners. Moreover, the income produced through illicit activities is significant, perhaps as much as $500 million per year, 35-40% of the nation's cash earning from trade. The proceeds of this criminal business goes directly to line the pockets of the Pyongyang elite, enriching their ability to maintain oppressive control, while in no way benefiting the impoverished populace.
DPRK illicit activities are not a local or regional phenomenon akin to the Balkans under Milosevic's Serbia. Instead, criminal networks linked to North Korea exist on every continent today - including as we found to our amazement even here in the US. Who would have thought in the course of the biggest Asian organized crime investigation in the US in a decade we would discover a network clearly linked to the North Koreans operating on both the East and West Coasts of the United States, engaged in selling tens of millions of dollars per year of contraband – everything from counterfeit US currency, counterfeit US postage stamps, counterfeit US branded cigarettes and state tax stamps, counterfeit Viagra, ecstasy, methamphetamine, heroin, AK-47s, and even shoulder launched missiles into the US. There were some things that I thought only existed in James Bond movies and comic books four years ago which today I hold as self-evident and true.
Second point, the potential for North Korean proliferation is not just a threat, but a reality and they have little, if any, respect for unenforced red-lines. Despite long-standing warnings from the US not to sell nuclear materiel or technology, North Korea was an active participant in the AQ Khan network and, among other things, shipped UF6 to Libya for enriching nuclear weapons grade uranium. In the missile arena, the North has been equally flagrant. On December 16, the German newspaper Bild reported that the German National Intelligence Service had information that Iran had bought 18 disassembled BM-25 missiles from North Korea. The BM-25 missile is based on the Soviet SS-N-6 ballistic missile and is alleged to be capable of delivering nuclear payloads to almost every Western European capital and to Israel. If this report is true, it represents perhaps the most serious proliferation of a missile to another country ever.
Undoubtedly, we all need to guard our flanks against the DPRK proliferation threat. As I have recommended on previous occasions, we need to take more aggressive protective measures, including enhancing the PSI to ensure that no North Korean flagged or leased vessels can travel far outside their waters without inspection and adopting a directed strategy against their proliferation trading company networks. The ROK, which has taken a laissez faire attitude toward the possibility of North Korean weapons proliferation, has an important role to play. There are several thousand containers each year coming out of North Korea from its two main container cargo ports: Najin on the east coast and Nampo on the west coast. To get into the international maritime transport system, they have to go through friendly ports, typically Pusan in the ROK and Shanghai and Dalian in China. Virtually none of these containers is subject to inspection. It's high time the ROK, which treats intra-Korean trade as domestic and not subject to normal customs inspection, take the lead in ensuring that the DPRK does not ship WMD or contraband into the international system through its ports by comprehensively policing the North Korean cargoes moving through its ports.
Third point, despite its profitability, crime and WMD proliferation are not a rational or sustainable basis for the DPRK's long-term survival; nor is nuclear coercion- as Secretary Powell used to tell us "they can't eat nukes." I personally have no doubt the North Korean leadership is interested in survival. Nonetheless, criminal dealings expose them personally to conventional criminal penalties while proliferation invites sanctions such as those directed against proliferation trading companies last fall. Criminality also tends to be accompanied by infighting over the proceeds, much like one observes on TV's, the Sopranos. Finally, criminal activity carried out by a government puts the government in clear violation of myriad international laws and agreements, ranging from the International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency to the Vienna conventions that govern diplomatic conduct to a host anti-money laundering regimes. This is dangerous and potentially debilitating business for North Koreans to be engaged in, exposing them not only to being shunned by bankers the world over as a probable money laundering risk but also jeopardizing their diplomatic status.
Fourth point: The President has called on the North Korean leadership to make a strategic choice. The DPRK needs to engage in what it calls a "bold switchover"- away from nukes, crime, and repression as the pillars of the regime, buttressed by a bankrupt ideological concept of Juche and an Army first state policy that is draining the economy dry. Instead, it must turn toward denuclearization, demobilization of the army, and economic and gradual political opening, in turn normalizing not just its relations but also its approach to the international community.
The members of the Six Party Talks - America included - need to offer to help North Korea transform. As with the case of Libya, we'll need to provide a clear roadmap of how this process will proceed, including the provision of large-scale economic support to rebuild and redirect North Korea's economy. The President's "bold approach" is not about buying them off, it would entail projects aimed at fundamentally redirecting their economic system away from communism toward capitalism (as a conservative who wants to end the Cold War in East Asia I have no problem with that). Furthermore, this strategy would address the needs of their people (i.e. civilian industry/jobs), not the "wants" of their communist leaders (cash pay-offs).
As Secretary Rice recently said, "it's North Korea's choice to be isolated. If they stop engaging in hostile acts and start cooperating they will reap the benefits of engagement." Let me add, this President is a believer in redemption, even for the North Korean leadership, provided they make an earnest attempt to fundamentally change direction in cooperation with the other powers. The ball is in their court.
Fifth, and finally, there will be no diplomatic progress if the DPRK's incentive structure does not change. Those who support sunshine should understand that to the extent the DPRK leadership can rely on a "moonshine economy" it will have little to no incentive to take us seriously (for non-native English speakers "moonshine" is illegal liquor). Thus while for the US and other partner states law enforcement and diplomacy are on clear separate tracks, aggressive law enforcement clearly supports the goal of influencing the DPRK leadership to make a positive strategic choice by making its current criminal framework unsustainable. Some may see this as a 'high stakes poker game,' but I believe it's a pretty shrewd betting strategy. And, at least we are playing a serious game rather than engaged in yet another diplomatic charade.
There are reasons to be encouraged that our strategy is working. In the face of economic pressure of its own making - created by the simple enforcement of laws it has broken flagrantly - the North has begun seriously looking at a new pathway. Kim's extended China trip and serious discussions of reform policies while there, the sudden reappearance of Chang Song Taek, and their renewed commitment to the 6PT all give hope that there is light at the end of the tunnel.
You can find this online at: http://www.aei.org/events/contentID.20060206124726512/default.asp
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David L. Asher, Ph.D.
Remarks to the National Security Seminar,4/5/06
I appreciate the opportunity to speak here today.
Allow me make the obligatory preface that in July of last year I left the Department of State, where I coordinated the North Korea Working Group and ran the North Korea Activities Group at the NSC. Obviously, I am speaking in a non-official capacity and my remarks are sensitive but unclassified. I ask that they be kept off-the-record and for official use only.
The topic I have been asked to address is “the Illicit Activities of the Kim Jong Il regime.” I will structure my remarks trying to answer four key questions:
I. What is going on and where?
II. How much is going on?
III. Who is doing it?
IV. US Policy Implications?
Let me start by noting the North Korean government’s official position on its relationship to illicit activities and trans-national organized crime. North Korea's official press agency, KCNA, recently declared that its government does "not allow such things as bad treatment of the people, counterfeiting and drug trafficking." In another statement, the DPRK asserted, "We had neither counterfeited currency nor gotten involved in any illegal trafficking." It added the DPRK has now adopted "an attitude that it will not participate in the six-party talks, unless the unjust US "financial sanctions" are lifted."
Despite such blatant propaganda, the rise of the North Korean criminal state is no secret. The facts don’t lie. Over the last decade and a half, as the industrial economy of Kim Il Song has collapsed, North Korea’s government has officially embraced criminal activities as a means of providing financial support for the leadership, many of whom have been personally involved. Hundreds of incidences of criminality by officials, Embassies, trading companies, and intelligence officers have been detected around the globe. While most of these have not been given great publicity, enough have to present a picture of a clear trans-national criminal conspiracy.
I. What are they doing and where?
DPRK linked criminal networks exist on every continent today – increasingly in partnership with organized crime partners. They are engaged in a remarkably wide range of activities – be it Heroin dealing in the Russian Far East or the Australian Southeast; distributing cocaine in Latin and South America; selling counterfeit cigarettes everywhere from Germany and Greece to India and Indonesia; trafficking Meth in Tokyo and Taipei, selling African rhino horn and elephant tusks in Southern China and Vietnam, smuggling humans in Cambodia and the Philippines, distributing counterfeit US currency – so called supernotes – everywhere from Macao to Manila to Lima and London.
To our amazement, we even caught them shipping stuff into the US. Almost four years ago we received information that counterfeit North Korean cigarettes apparently were coming in the West Coast. The Secret Service, which had already been investigating the counterfeit cigarette trade in Asia due to its apparent linkage to the distribution of counterfeit US currency, was asked to check into this. Working with the FBI they were able to confirm that these counterfeit cigarette reports did appear to be valid by making a controlled purchase and delivery. However, to provide clearer proof and to evaluate the scale of activity in the US that could be linked to the DPRK, they launched a huge undercover investigation, codenamed “Royal Charm.” Royal Charm was centered on the creation of a false-front Mafia group in northern New Jersey, reminiscent of the one on America TV hit, the Sopranos. This group went into partnership with the Asian organized criminals on the West Coast who were already subject of the investigation into the counterfeit cigarette trade called “operation Smoking Dragon.”
Through Royal Charm and Smoking Dragon a network linked to North Korea and Chinese criminal partners was documented. This network, as the unsealed indictments show, was engaged in selling tens of millions of dollars per year of contraband – everything from counterfeit US currency, counterfeit US postage stamps, counterfeit US branded cigarettes and state tax stamps, counterfeit Viagra, ecstasy, methamphetamine, heroin, AK-47s, and even attempting to sell shoulder fired missile launches into the US. There were some things that I thought only existed in James Bond movies and comic books four years ago which today I believe to be true. [show chart of distribution of DPRK linked counterfeit cigarettes in the US]
II. How Much is Going on?
I am frequently asked "how much is this stuff going on?" Although it is hard to pin down the exact scale of the illicit activity at an unclassified level (and not easy even with class sources) by going backward through the partner country trade data and drawing on reported law enforcement seizures we can make a rough guess. Based on these methods, we can guess that the sum of activity is in the range of $450-550 million per year. This may not sound like much it could be as much as 35-40% of DPRK exports and a much larger percentage of its total cash earnings (conventional trade profit margins are low but the margin on illegal businesses is extremely high, frequently over 500%).
The following five areas seem to be most important in terms of export income:
1. Counterfeit cigarettes
The production of counterfeit cigarettes may now be the largest export of North Korea and one with global reach, with containerized cargoes frequently coming from the ports of Najin and Nampo for shipment via major ports in China and the ROK throughout the world. Over the last four years, in parallel and in support of the US law enforcement investigations, several leading members of the international cigarette industry commenced their own undercover sophisticated investigation.
Recently a report from this investigation became quoted in the media. The report declares: “The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has emerged in the past five years as one of the principal sources of counterfeit international brand cigarettes. Reporting from informants, undercover investigators, and industry insiders indicates that between 10 and 12 factories are – or recently have been – active producing counterfeit cigarettes in the country. Six of these factories are located in P’yongyang or its suburbs, while as many as six are in or near the Raijin area on the north east coast of the DPRK. We assess that total production from these factories could equal some 41 billion sticks, or four million master cases, annually (see chart). Reporting from intelligence sources, as well as information generated during the course of conducting controlled buys, indicates that DPRK-origin counterfeits have been selling at between US$130- to US$180 per master case [at] a nearby Asian port (Busan, Manila, or Kaohsiung). At these rates, the industry could generate between US$520 to US$720 million in gross revenue annually.
[ Although we do not know how much of the total? revenue is passed on to the DPRK regime, intelligence from similar production and export operations in the PRC suggest that….at an annual production rate of four million cases, the P’yongyang regime’s earnings could equal at least US$80 to US$160 million per year. These fees could actually be substantially higher in the DPRK given the large scale of several of the factories concerned and the total control the regime has over these operations.
The DPRK military and internal security service? respectively also reportedly own and run at least two of the factories (Dongyang Cigarette and Linglou Island 888 Cigarette factories – see below) suggesting most of the revenue generated by these go directly into the regime’s coffers.” ]
Let me underline the profitability of this illicit business: A forty foot container of counterfeit cigarettes might cost as little as $70,000 to produce and have a street value of 3-4 million dollars, so it’s not surprising that the North has focused on this business line—with its profits increased if tax stamps are forged (something that has been observed repeatedly of late, costing affected states such as California tens of millions in stamp revenue per year).
2. Weapons:
The government of the North Korea and its trading companies remain very significant players in the global weapons trade. In reaction, the US along with many other government have launched the Proliferation Security Initiative and made a variety of efforts to counter-DPRK weapons trading activities. Nonetheless, our efforts continue to fall short. [show missile slide] On December 16, the German newspaper Bild reported that the German National Intelligence Service had information that Iran had bought 18 disassembled BM-25 missiles from North Korea. The BM-25 missile is based on the Soviet SS-N-6 ballistic missile and is alleged to be capable of delivering nuclear payloads to almost every Western European capital and to Israel. If this report is true, it represents perhaps the most serious proliferation of a missile to another country ever. I have no idea of the profits associated with the sale of such a missile but undoubtedly they are considerable.
3. Drugs
DPRK Narco trafficking continues as a major income generator, some estimate $100-200 million per year. Among others, Nanam Pharmaceutical Factory, Mannyun Pharmaceutical Factory, Sujong Joint-venture Trading have been repeatedly implicated by defectors in the ROK press as major producers.
China continues to be the major market for North Korean drugs. The situation became so bad that in March of 2004 the Vice Minister of the MPS called a highly unusual “press conference” to announce his determination to cut into DPRK drug rings in Jilin province, selling heroin and methamphetamine, on the border with North Korea (which some Chinese law enforcement officials have stated is “out of control”
Japan probably still comes in second. From 1998-2002 Japanese police interdicted nearly 1500 kg of meth that in six separate prosecuted cases was shown to have originated in the DPRK. The ROK probably comes in third, although some say the Philippines is bigger.
Although the number of reported seizures in Asia has declined dramatically, my guess is that this decline largely reflects their adoption alternative means for bringing drugs into Japan, Korea, and China including, more small boat deliveries and use of Chinese triads, Russia Mafia, and Korean gangs as well as human “mules” to smuggle material on or inside their person.
A final, important reason we have seen less high profile seizures is that they have shifted business lines. The key new aspect of drug trafficking is the counterfeit pharmaceutical area, where margins are even higher than in normal drug trafficking. This is a multi-billion dollar global business, overall, and we have found it to be one North Koreans, in partnership with Chinese gangs, have targeted aggressively. [show counterfeit Viagra slide]
4. Production and international distribution of counterfeit currency, in particular the US dollar
The US Secret Service has been investigating the circulation of the “supernote” counterfeit dollars since 1989. Last year it charged that the counterfeit US notes were “manufactured in, and under auspices of the government of, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“North Korea”). Individuals, including North Korean nationals acting as ostensible government officials, engaged in the worldwide transportation, delivery, and sale of quantities of Supernotes.”
As the Secret Service has now revealed, the Federal Reserve Bank has come into the possession of roughly $48 million of these notes in the last fifteen years. Some argue that this shows that counterfeiting is just a drop in the bucket. Let me argue against this view.
First, although supernote definitely can be detected, it is of such high grade that much of it circulates undetected. Largely this is because it has been primarily distributed in the economies of Asia, the former Soviet Union, Africa, and the Americas where the dollar functions as a parallel currency and major money center banks that process currency are few. Another reason for the low amount of detected circulation is that the banks themselves only lose money if they allow the notes to be turned over for processing back to the US. They receive no compensation for being honest. The dirty little secret among bankers and bank tellers appears to be that if they unwittingly accept supernote deposits they should then recirculate them along with genuine currency. They can do this because to almost everyone the notes appear genuine and can be passed as “real.” Thus, for these reasons there could be a lot more of the notes out there than we can document.
Finally, let me briefly comment on the impact of the notes on the dollar. First, a little supernote can go a long way toward causing instability. In the summer of 2004, a significant sum of supernotes – in the millions – was circulated by a criminal gang in Taiwan. As the notes were detected, confusion set in among summer travelers who had exchanged Taiwan dollars for tens of millions of US dollars. The Central Bank of Taiwan decided to put out a warning advising that counterfeit notes of extraordinary quality were circulating and that people in possession of CB-series US $100 bills should have them checked for authenticity at banks. This caused a panic as people rushed to turn in several hundred million dollars in a rush – it was a minor “run” on the dollar. I can’t get into details but this was not the first such instance (although perhaps the most alarming).
Second, it was just announced that the US Treasury next year will begin circulating new $50 and $100 bills – the second redesign of our currency since 1996. The cost of printing and circulating the new notes (and withdrawing the old ones) will be enormous, hundreds of millions of dollars, potentially. There is only reason for this radical move: North Korea.
5. Smuggling sanctioned items, including conflict diamonds, rhino horn and ivory, and endangered species, utilizing official diplomatic means
Although I don’t have time to get into detail I find this to be one of the most outrageous and unacceptable of the DPRK’s criminal income sources, absolutely contravening international law, including the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.
[6. Money laundering for its own account and in partnership with recognized organized crime groups abroad:
Money laundering is less for profit than to protect illicit profits but since it has become such a huge issue, let me offer a few comments.
1. Macao has been known as a money laundering center for years. Nonetheless, the government turned a blind eye.
2. US law enforcement investigations into DPRK illicit activities clearly paint Macao as an overseas center for North Korean criminal operations and for those of its partners.
3. BDA was being willingly used by North Korea to facilitate a wide range of illicit activity, from money laundering of drug proceeds, counterfeit cigarettes, even putting into circulation counterfeit U.S. currency. It reportedly also had almost no normal financial controls or detailed records.
4. Banco Delta Asia is hardly the only Macao Bank to be engaged in collusion with the North Koreans. Public US indictments reveal there were several others. The message is that a comprehensive modernization of both Macao and mainland Chinese money laundering laws is needed. I believe China is interested in cooperating, and obviously their banks could lose a lot if they were ever subject to further US designation.
5. The US Treasury has put out a warning to banks around the world to be careful about dealing with North Korean entities and North Koreans. This is not a prohibition but only a warning.
III. Who is doing it?
The issue of state leadership involvement is very important it is hard to detail at an unclassified level. However, the panicked reaction of the North Koreans to the BDA asset freeze speaks for itself. The media report that Kang Sang-ch'un, deputy head of the OGC and a key KJI slush fund supervisor, was dispatched, apparently to withdraw funds was remarkable. The fact that the Chinese apparently stopped this withdrawal and briefly arrested him is even more interesting.
Let’s me more broadly note what the North Korean government itself asserts that all assets belong to the State and that all activities of North Korea and North Koreans are controlled by the Worker’s Party. The North Korean head of state in fact remains Kim Il Song. The leader of the Worker’s Party is Kim Jong Il. Anything that occurs without the consent of the Party – and its leaders – is inherently a violation of North Korea law.
North Korea is perhaps the only country in the world whose embassies and overseas personnel are expected to contribute income to the “Party Center,” not rely on central government funds for their operations. Such repeated illicit actions from diplomatic premises amount to a serial violation of both articles 31 and 41 of the Vienna conventions on Diplomatic Relations, which respectively convey that A. commercial, and most certainly, criminal activities for profit shall not be conducted by accredited diplomats or via accredited facilities and B. mandate that officials posted abroad must obey the laws of the nation to which they are posted. The DPRK routinely pays no attention to either critical provision of the Vienna conventions. If the DPRK continues to engage in criminal activities out of its Embassies, its officers could be expelled and its Embassies shut.
US Policy Implications:
First, we all need to guard our flanks against the DPRK proliferation threat. As I have recommended on previous occasions, we need to take more aggressive protective measures, including enhancing the PSI to ensure that no North Korean flagged or leased vessels can travel far outside their waters without inspection and adopting a directed strategy against their proliferation trading company networks. The ROK, which has taken a laissez faire attitude toward the possibility of North Korean weapons proliferation, has an important role to play. There are several thousand containers each year coming out of North Korea from its two main container cargo ports: Najin on the east coast and Nampo on the west coast. To get into the international maritime transport system, they have to go through friendly ports, typically Pusan in the ROK and Shanghai and Dalian in China. Virtually none of these containers is subject to inspection. It's high time the ROK, which treats intra-Korean trade as domestic and not subject to normal customs inspection, take the lead in ensuring that the DPRK does not ship WMD or contraband into the international system through its ports by comprehensively policing the North Korean cargoes moving through its ports.
Second point, law enforcement and counter-proliferation are not inherently antithetical to an engagement strategy. It’s in North Korea’s objective interest to shift directions. Despite its profitability, crime and WMD proliferation are not a rational or sustainable basis for the DPRK's long-term survival; nor is nuclear coercion- as Secretary Powell used to tell us "they can't eat nukes." I personally have no doubt the North Korean leadership is interested in survival. Nonetheless, criminal dealings expose them personally to conventional criminal penalties while proliferation invites sanctions such as those directed against proliferation trading companies last fall. Criminality also tends to be accompanied by infighting over the proceeds, much like one observes on TV's, the Sopranos. Finally, criminal activity carried out by a government puts the government in clear violation of myriad international laws and agreements, ranging from the International Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency to the Vienna conventions that govern diplomatic conduct to a host anti-money laundering regimes. This is dangerous and potentially debilitating business for North Koreans to be engaged in, exposing them not only to being shunned by bankers the world over as a probable money laundering risk but also jeopardizing their diplomatic status.
Third point: We can’t expect them to do this without help. The President has called on the North Korean leadership to make a strategic choice. The DPRK needs to engage in what it calls a "bold switchover"- away from nukes, crime, and repression as the pillars of the regime, buttressed by a bankrupt ideological concept of Juche and an Army first state policy that is draining the economy dry. Instead, it must turn toward denuclearization, demobilization of the army, and economic and gradual political opening, in turn normalizing not just its relations but also its approach to the international community.
The members of the Six Party Talks - America included - need to offer to help North Korea transform. As with the case of Libya, we'll need to provide a clear roadmap of how this process will proceed, including the provision of large-scale economic support to rebuild and redirect North Korea's economy. The President's "bold approach" is not about buying them off, it would entail projects aimed at fundamentally redirecting their economic system away from communism toward capitalism (as a conservative who wants to end the Cold War in East Asia I have no problem with that). Furthermore, this strategy would address the needs of their people (i.e. civilian industry/jobs), not the "wants" of their communist leaders (cash pay-offs).
As Secretary Rice has said, "it's North Korea's choice to be isolated. If they stop engaging in hostile acts and start cooperating they will reap the benefits of engagement." Let me add, this President is a believer in redemption, even for the North Korean leadership, provided they make an earnest attempt to fundamentally change direction in cooperation with the other powers. The ball is in their court.
Finally, let me conclude by noting there will be no diplomatic progress if the DPRK's incentive structure does not change. Those who support sunshine should understand that to the extent the DPRK leadership can rely on a "moonshine economy" it will have little to no incentive to take us seriously (for non-native English speakers "moonshine" is illegal liquor). Thus while for the US and other partner states law enforcement and diplomacy are on clear separate tracks, aggressive law enforcement clearly supports the goal of influencing the DPRK leadership to make a positive strategic choice by making its current criminal framework unsustainable. Some may see this as a 'high stakes poker game,' but I believe it's a pretty shrewd betting strategy. And, at least we are playing a serious game rather than engaged in yet another diplomatic charade.
There are reasons to be encouraged that our strategy is working. In the face of economic pressure of its own making - created by the simple enforcement of laws it has broken flagrantly - the North has begun seriously looking at a new pathway. Kim's extended China trip and serious discussions of reform policies while there, the sudden reappearance of Chang Song Taek, their recent admission of illegal activities, and their dispatching of a envoy to discuss financial sanctions and law enforcement actions against them, make me believe our strategy is working rather well.
